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A THEORETICAL AND APPLIED
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ABSTRACT
Conventional analysis in the trade-industrial-organization literature
suggests that, when a country has some market power over an imported
good, some small level of protection must be welfare improving. This is
essentially a terms-of-trade argument that is reinforced if the imported goods
are substitutes for domestic goods produced with increasing returns to scale,
goods that are initially underproduced in free-trade equilibrium. This paper
notes that this result may not hold when (1) the imports are intermediates
used in a domestic increasing-returns industry, and/or (2) the intermediates
are complements for domestic inputs produced with increasing returns. We
then demonstrate such an outcome with respect to Mexican protection
against imported auto parts using an applied general-equilibrium model of
the North American auto industry.
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Boulder, CO 80309-025651. Introduction
A number of papers in the trade-industrial-organization literature,
particularly those exploiting monopolistic- competition models, derive results
that support protectionist arguments in import-competing sectors. These policy
prescriptions rely on two reinforcing welfare effects. First, since products are
differentiated, countries have some measure of monopoly power in trade no
matter how small they are. Thus there is the usual terms-of-trade argument
for protection. Second, the imported products are (usually implicitly) assumed
to be substitutes for domestic products produced with increasing returns. The
latter goods are undersupplied in free trade equilibrium insofar as prices
exceed marginal costs. Import protection thus switches expenditure from the
foreign goods to the domestic goods which creates a secondary benefit due to
the existing distortion. Much of the analysis is found in Flam and Helpman
(1987), Venables (1987) and discussed at length in Helpman (1990). To
the best of our knowledge, the only papers that present an alternative
conclusion within the same class of models are Markusen (1989, 1990).
Markusen uses Ethier (1982) as a point of departure, assuming that the
differentiated goods produced with increasing returns are intermediate goods,
used as inputs into final production. Within this framework, it is reasonable
to suggest that imported and domestic differentiated intermediates may be
complementary.In many developing countries, for example, imported
machinery, high-tech and/or capital-intensive components, and the services of
engineering consultants may be complements for domestic inputs.
When the relationship between domestic and imported intermediates is
complementary, a tariff or other barrier against the foreign goods/services may
be welfare reducing. The terms-of-trade argument remains valid, but a tariff
may now switch expenditure away from the domestic intermediates. Higher
prices for the imported intermediates reduce the output of the final good(s)
and, because the domestic intermediates are complementary, the effect of the
—1-reduced output on domestic intermediate demand dominates any expenditure
switching from the foreign to the domestic intermediates. This generates a
negative welfare effect due to the difference between price and marginal cost
noted above. If this "derationalization" effect dominates the terms-of-trade
effect, then even a small level of import protection is welfare reducing
(Markusen 1990).
The possibility of welfare-reducing protection in spite of a favorable
terms-of-trade effect is more likely if the intermediates are in turn an input
into a final good produced with increasing returns. Again, due to an excess
of price over marginal cost, such an industry is under-producing for the
domestic market. It may also be under-exporting (if indeed it is an export
industry), although this is much less obvious.
The purpose of this paper is to develop these ideas and apply them to a
particular case study. Section 2 below develops a simple model to exposit the
theoretical possibility of welfare-reducing protection. Section 3 outlines the
details of the applied general-equilibrium model, which further develops the
North American auto model of Hunter, Markusen, and Rutherford (1992) by
adding an auto parts sector.'Section 4 presents results of several
counter-factual experiments, and shows that Mexico achieves a welfare gain
by unilaterally removing its protection on auto parts. Mexican auto production
and exports significantly expand following the removal of parts protection, and
Mexican auto parts production also experiences an increased output. This last
result is an illustration of the "derationalization" effect: protection on parts
generates a scale effect that dominates the expenditure switching effect.
1The purposes of the Hunter, Markusen, and Rutherford paper are very
different from the objectives of the present paper. The former paper is
concerned with the effects of multinational price and output coordination on
trade liberalization scenarios, and with the ability of producers to segment
markets (free trade for producers versus free trade for consumers).
-2-Finally, zero protection on parts is shown to be the optimal (non-negative)
protection level for Mexico.
2. The Theoretical Argument
In this section, we will outline the principal theoretical argument of
the paper. We will attempt to keep the analysis simple and stylized, since
some of the points have previously appeared in print. A fully analysis of the
technology and markup formulae etc. in the auto sector (sector X below) is
given in Hunter, Markusen, and Rutherford.
Suppose that an economy has two final goods X and Y, and an
intermediate good Z (parts). Foreign Z is differentiated from domestic Z and
so the former is denoted Z. Throughout the paper, foreign variables are
superscripted with a 'i'.Wewill think of Mexico as the domestic (home)
economy and the US as the foreign country throughout.Domestic
consumption of X and Y are denoted C and C, and domestic welfare is given
by
(1) U =U(C,C)
Good X (autos) is produced using domestic labor, L and domestic and
imported Z.
(2) X =F(L,Z,Z*)
Good Y is produced with constant returns to scale by a competitive industry
using labor and a sector-specific factor R.
(3) Y =G(L,R)
Z is produced from labor alone.
-3-(4) Z =H(L)
Let Y be numeraire and let p (p denote the home and export price
of X in terms of Y respectively (p is the foreign price net of foreign
protection). Assume for simplicity that Z is not exported (and therefore non-
traded). p (p) will denote the home price of Z and the foreign (import)
price of Z respectively. The balance-of-payments constraint for the economy
is given by
(5) p:E+E_p:z*=o,E_=X-C EY-C,
whereE and E are domestic excess supplies of X and Y respectively. We
assume no tariffs or export taxes initially, so p gives the domestic price of Z
as well as the import price. X is an export good by assumption and exporters
of X may be able to price discriminate between markets, so p, and p need not
be equal. In our applied model developed in the following section, auto firms
are foreign owned, but free entry drives profits to zero so that there is no
repatriation term in (5).
We assume that a unit of exports of X requires a shipping cost of s
units of labor, so total labor devoted to exporting is L =sEx.The overall
labor constraint (L) on the domestic economy is given by
(6)
Through a process of differentiation and substitution, equations (1)
through (6) can be transformed into a welfare differential useful for policy
analysis.Differentiating (1), we obtain an expression for the change in
welfare measured in terms of good Y.
-4-dU U
(7) dW= —= —dc+dc
y y
Nowdifferentiate the production function X in (2), and replace dX with dC
÷dEs.
(8) dX =dC+dEFIdLX +FdZ+F.
dZ *
Xand Z are assumed to be produced with increasing returns by
imperfectly competitive industries. Let m and m be the markups (wedge
between price and marginal cost) applied to domestic and foreign sales of X
respectively, and let w denote the home (Mexican) wage rate in terms of Y.
If the US market is served by plants in both the US and Mexico, optimal
pricing implies that the MNE equates delivered marginal cost from Mexico to
the US marginal cost. Specifically, US marginal cost (mc) is equated to
delivered marginal cost from Mexico inclusive of the US tariff (t*) levied on
Mexican marginal cost (mc,) plus shipping cost (ws): mc =(1+ t)(mc +
ws). The firm's pricing equations for thee foreign (US) and domestic
(Mexico) economies are given by
(9) p'(1 —mj,') =mc=(1÷t*)(mc +ws),p(l —mi) =mc
where p is the foreign (US) domestic price of autos: p =p(l+ t*). Noting
this last relationship, divide the first equation of (9) through by (1 + t') and
replace p(l + t with p. The two equations of (9) together then imply
(10) p;(1 —m') —ws =p(1—mi) =mc
Factors of production used in the X industry are paid their marginal revenue
products (marginal revenue times physical marginal products), so we can
-5-multiply (8) through by marginal revenue
-m,)=p(l-ni)-wsgiven in (10) to get
(11)
(1 -m)dC +p(1 -dE -wsdE=wdL+pdZ + pdZ *
Thesecond equality of (11) follows from the fact that marginal revenue
products of factors equal factor prices; e.g., p(l -ni,)F1=w.Differentiate
(4) and multiply through by marginal revenue
p(l -m)where m is the domestic markup on parts.
(12) dZ =H'dL;'(1 —m)dZ =wdL
The second equality follows from the fact that the marginal-revenue product
of labor, p(i -m)H',equals the wage, w. Differentiate (3) recalling that Y
is numeraire (implying w =G').
(13) dY =GI'dL
=wdL
Rearrange (11) with only wdL +wsdEon the right-hand side. Sum (11),
(12), and (13) noting that the sum of the right-hand sides equals zero: w(dLA
+dL+dL+sdE)=0.
(14)
p (1 -m)dC+p(1 -m)dE -pdZ-dZ+p(1 -m)dZ +dY






Add (16) to (15)




Now assume that the domestic economy institutes a small import tariff
on Z*. Assume also without further analysis that this tariff has the 'expected"
effects of (A) reducing imports of Z* and driving down the import price of Z,
dp < 0; (B) reducing the domestic consumption and exports of the final good
X and thereby driving up the world price of X, [dCx, dEJ <0,dp >0.
The first term in (17) results from the distortion between price and
marginal cost on domestic sales of X. This first term in (17) has a negative
sign: the tariff on Z reduces domestic consumption of X, which is priced
above marginal cost, thus there is a loss of the consumption change times the
difference between price and marginal cost, (p, -mcj= p,(m,.2
Trade economists will recognize the first term in square brackets in
(17) as a volume-of-trade effect and a terms-of-trade effect on exports of X.
The optimal export tax is simply the value of m that sets this expression to
zero. In the present case, the auto firms pick m, and the markup may
therefore be greater than or less than its optimal value. With dE <0and dp
2Although the auto firms are foreign owned, the difference between price
and marginal cost (mc) is captured by the Mexican economy in our model.
Free entry drives profits to zero, and (p -mc)accrues to the Mexican
economy as lower average cost (ac) (higher productivity). Denote total cost
as c, so c, = ac*X. We then have mc = dc/dX = X(dac/dX) +ac.(p
-mc,)then equals (p,- ac) -X(dacIdX).The first term accrues to the
multinational but is zero in our model due to free entry. The second term
including the minus sign is positive (decreasing average cost) and accrues to
the Mexican economy as higher real wages.
-7-> 0due to the tariff on Z, this expression in the first set of square brackets
in (17) contributes negatively to welfare if
E dp"
(18) >----—--- > 0.
dE,
Most readers will recognize the right-hand side of (18) as the (inverse) price
elasticity of foreign import demand for X. This inequality will hold if the
actual markup applied by the exporters of X (m) is greater than the "optimal"
export tax given by the right-hand side of (18). In other words, (18) holds jf
the country is under exporting" X initially. This question has been much
discussed in the trade industrial-organization literature, with Brander and
Spencer (1985) showing that a single domestic Cournot firm under exports (the
markup is too high), and Eaton and Grossman (1985) showing that a single
Bertrand firm (or several Cournot firms) over export (the markup is too
low) .
Theoptimal export tax formula takes into account a production
response in the foreign country, implying that a given increase in domestic
exports is larger than the resulting increase in the foreign consumption level
since some foreign production is displaced: dC/dB <1.This in turn implies
that -[dpIdCJ > -[dp/dEj.Wecan rewrite this last expression as
(19) = >
CpdC adE c x x x x x
Theterm in brackets on the left-hand side of (19) is the (inverse) Marshallian
3See also Brown (1989) and Hertel (1992) for more general discussions
concerning alternative pricing rules.
-8-price elasticity of demand, denoted o. The left-hand side of (19) is thus, in
the context of the model to follow, the share of Mexican exports of autos in
US auto consumption, denoted s,,,, divided by the Marshallian price elasticity
of demand in the US.
In our model to follow, US multinational firms coordinate their
exports from Mexico (and Canada) to the US with their US production and
sales. These firms complete with one another according to a Cournot markup
rule time a calibrated parameter that is very close to 1.0, so let's ignore the
later. The markup m applied to Mexican exports is then given by the share
of one US multinational in the US market, denoted s., divided by the
Marshallian price elasticity of demand: m =slii. From(18) and (19), a
sufficient condition for (18) to hold is thus that s >s,,:the share of one US
multinational car producer in the US market must be larger than the share of
all Mexican auto exports in the US market. In our data, s. is just over 10%
(averaged over large and small firms) while s,, is just over 1 %.Thusin our
data and theoretical model formulation, the inequality in (18) holds. Mexico
is under exporting autos initially to the US (i.e., the initial markup is too
high), and this in turn implies that the reduction in exports caused by the
import tariff on Z contributes negatively to Mexican welfare according to the
first bracketed term in (17).
The seconed term in square brackets in (17) consists of a term
resulting from the distortion between price and marginal cost on domestic parts
sales, and a terms-of-trade effect on imported parts. The sum of these two
terms (the entire expression in the second set of square brackets) is analyzed
by Markusen (1990). (-Zdp) >0due to the fact that the import tariff on Z
drives down the import price of Z. This is the usual favorable terms-of-trade
effect discussed earlier. In the conventional analysis of differentiated final
goods (Flam and Helpman (1987), Venables (1987)), the first term p1nidZ is
-9-also positive, since the import tariff switches expenditure from the foreign
goods to the domestic goods. Markusen (1990) shows that this effect can be
reverse when the Z's are complementary intermediate inputs such that pmdZ
<0,and indeed the strength of this effect can outweigh the favorable terms-
of-trade effect. Markusen shows that this perverse' outcome is more likely
as (A) the elasticity of substitution between Z and Z is low, and (B) the price
elasticity of demand for X is high (in the present case, the domestic price
elasticity). The latter effect strengthens the expenditure switching away from
X when the price of Z increases, making it more likely that the negative scale
effect on demand for Z outweighs the substitution effect in favor of Z.
This analysis establishes the theoretical plausibility that all three terms
in (17) might be negative, or at least the plausibility that the entire expression
is negative. Considering certain aspects of the Mexican auto (X) and auto
parts industry (Z) that we have referred to and will expand upon below, there
is then a prima facia case that Mexico's optimal (non-negative) protection level
in that industry might be zero.
3. The Applied General-Equilibrium Model
The model consists of four regions: Canada (CAN), the United States
(USA), Mexico (MEX), and the rest of the world (ROW). There are two final
goods in the model and two primary factors, immobile between countries.
Good Y is a homogeneous product produced by a competitive industry with
constant returns to scale. Y is produced with a composite factor which we
will refer to as "labor" (although it bears no relationship to empirical labor)
and a sector-specific factor R. Y is numeraire, and the existence of R implies
that labor must be drawn into the auto sector at increasing cost in terms of Y.
X is finished autos, which we have modelled as a homogeneous good.
-10-There is clearly product differentiation by firm, but not by country per se (US
consumers generally do not know if their US car is made in the US, Canada,
or Mexico), so we have simply modelled cars as homogeneous. Cars are
produced with 'labor" and parts (Z) which are assumed to be differentiated by
firm. Empirically, the types of parts produced and exported by firms in
Mexico are quite different from the parts that are imported.
There are two types of auto firms in the model, North American (NA)
and rest-of-world (R). Each NA firm is assumed to have plants in each of
CAN, USA, and ROW initially, and to coordinate production, pricing, and
shipments among the three markets to maximize firm profits. NA firms are
assumed to be able to segment markets (consumer price arbitrage constraints
do not bind) which is consistent with our evidence on prices in the three
countries. R firms export to North American, but do not produce within
North American.
Production cost for a typej firm (j =NA,R)in market i (CD is given
by a constant marginal cost (for a given price of labor) (meD times output plus
a fixed cost (also a function of the price of labor) (fc).
(20) Cf= mcf*xf + ftf,acf =Cf ixf = mcI+fcfjxf
where ae is average cost and X is output of a j-type firm in market i. The
elasticity of scale (e), which we get from engineering data combined with




Note that the elasticity of scale is a variable, and falls with firm output.
Firm typej sets a markup m in market i, and if it is a NA firm that
-11—also ships to market i from market k, joint maximization across plants requires
that the marginal cost in i is equated to the delivered marginal cost from
market k. Let r1 denote the shipping cost from market k to market i, and t
the ad valorem tariff rate from k to i. We assume that the tariff rate is applied
to marginal cost plus transport cost. The pricing equations are thus
(22) p(l —me')=mcf=(1+t)(mc+
Weassume free entry and exit of firms such that profits equal zero.
We make this operational by assuming zero profits at the plant level for NA
firms. That is, no copy of an additional plant (same output, shipments, prices,
and markups as existing plants) can make positive profits. For a NA plant
located in market k and shipping to some or all of the three NA countries, this
condition is given by
(23) p,'mfX,=fcI =(CAN,USA,MEX),j= NA
For the multi-plant firms (j =NA),equations (21), (22) (first
equality), and (23) give us nine equations in nine unknown (i =
CAN,TJSA,MEX).Variables p, ,Xj,X, are known, and our preliminary
calibration program then solves this system for the nine unknowns m, mci, and
fej. The estimates of the elasticity of scale and the free entry assumption are
thus allowed to determine the initial markups.
These markups are then used to calculate a 'conjecture parameter" ti
which reconciles the calibrated markup with a Cournot pricing rule.
(24) mf=
-12-where s is the share of a j-type firm in the sales of cars in market i, andis
the Marshallian price elasticity of demand in market i. The term in brackets
is the Coumot pricing rule for a homogeneous product, market share divided
by the Marshallian price elasticity of demand. Markups are thus Cournot if
U =1.Our calibration indicates that the US is somewhat more competitive
than Cournot (0 =0.88),while Canada and Mexico are much more
collusive than Cournot (1 =2.45,( =2.49).The I's are held constant
in subsequent analysis while the market shares are allowed to vary. Finally,
the transport cost parameters r are calibrated using (22).
The parts sector Z is assumed to be monopolistically competitive,
with product differentiation by firm. While the multinational car producers
certainly have significant parts production, there are a great many small
producers as well (about 500 in Mexico, 2300 in the US). We thus make the
modelling choice that parts producers are treated as small, independent,
national firms. We will exposit just a two-region example to show how the
parts sector works. In the notation of the previous section of this paper,
domestic and foreign composite parts Z and Z* are composed of the individual
underlying parts from each country, and these are in turn aggregated into a




= = z , zt
Letp denote the domestic price of the domestic parts composite Z.
Any part produced will be produced in the same amount and priced the same,
so we can deal with a representative part. It is assumed that the small parts
producers cannot segment markets, so arbitrage constraints hold and we need
-13-only consider the domestic price received on both domestic and export sales.
The price received by an individual domestic parts firms, p,isthe marginal
product of Z1inproducing Z. The revenue of the producer is then pZ,.
These are given by
(26)p,
=p(l/13) Z' - PZt-'
R =1Z = [pAZ' -
Wemake the usual monopolistic-competition assumption that each parts
producer views itself as small in the market, so that Z and p2 are viewed as
constant. Hence the bracketed term in the second equation of (26) is viewed




[p2Z' - P] f3Z,-' =
13
Priceis a constant markup over marginal cost. We assume the same type of
cost function that we did for auto producers: a fixed cost plus a constant
marginal cost. Free entry produces zero profits: price equals average cost.
Together these give us
(28) =,nc,"i,= ac2] acjmc =1/13
whereisthe elasticity of scale in parts production. Our data estimates of
these elasticities give us estimates for the substitution parameter f3 for each
country's parts composite (i.e., these vary across countries).
Note that (28) implies that Z1 and Z7 are constants; since parts are
produced using only the composite factor "labor', ac/mc is independent of
factor prices and depends only on Z1. If ac/mc is constant, so is 4Theparts
industry expands through the addition of new firms (Helpman and Krugman
(1985) provide extensive discussions of this type of model). The production
-14-functions for the parts composites can be written as
(29) Z =nZ1,Z4 =
whereZ1 and Z are constants. We thus have convenient 'industry" production
functions for the parts composite of each country in (29), with that production
function homogeneous of degree 1/j3 >1in country i. We use this
simplification in computing the solution to the model.
-15-4. Data. Results, Interpretations
Tables 1 through S present some of the data used in the model and
several key calibrated parameters. Table 1 gives GNP, the elasticities of scale
in autos and parts production, the number of firms operating in the country,
relative prices of cars and parts in terms of the composite commodity, and the
share of North American firms in total auto sales in each country. Note that
the number of firms producing in the US is not the same as the number of
those in Canada and Mexico, so we made a modelling simplification in this
regard when we assumed that all NA firms operate in all three countries.4
Table 2 gives protection levels and includes conversion of non-tariff
barriers to tariff equivalents. We regard this as appropriate for present
purposes, which is assess the effects of protection when we have intermediate
goods of this type, rather than to predict the effect of a free trade area per se.
In a later paper, we will attempt to model the various non-tariff barriers on
content protection, balance of payments, ownership, etc.
Table 3 gives flows of finished autos in billions of US dollars. Since
autos are treated as a homogeneous good, we list net trade flows (exports
minus imports) in this table. Table 3 also gives parts flows, where two-way
flows are listed since parts are assumed differentiated by firm. Parts include
engines, but parts used in the production of parts are netted out (our figure for
this intermediate use is 20%). Note that Mexico is a net exporter of cars to
the US and a net importer of parts from the US.
Table 5givessome calibrated parameters and "guesstimates. PS is
the share of purchased parts in car production, while PC is the share of parts
sold directly to final consumption (spares). We don't have good figures for
4The five firms in Canada are not the same five as those in Mexico. Six
of the eight US firms produce in either Canada or Mexico. See Hunter,
Markusen, and Rutherford (1992) for more details and a discussion of our
modelling assumption.
-16-PS, but PC is between 20 and 30%, so by setting PC in this range we infer
values for PS. The lower value in the US than Canada and Mexico suggests
more integrated plants in the US. The figures for ROW seem, inaccurate; the
ROW parts industry should be much larger, but this likely has a trivial effect
on our results for NA liberalization. m'and(1NAarethe calibrated values of
the markup and "conjecture" parameters respectively. The latter are much
higher for Canada and Mexico relative to the US (more collusive pricing in the
smaller economies)
-
and,while they take on similar values in Canada and
Mexico, Canada has a much smaller markup due to the fact that firms in
Canada have individually smaller market sizes. iisthe elasticity of the wage
rate" (marginal cost of production) with respect to auto sector production.
0.20 indicates that a doubling of auto production would increase marginal cost
by 20%, a simple guess on our part. This elasticity is used to calibrate the
share of the specific factor in the composite sector (see Hunter, Markusen, and
Rutherford). a is the elasticity of substitution in consumption between the
composite commodity and autos. This elasticity plays little role given the way
we have constructed the model; increasing it would just be compensated for
by an increase in the conjecture parameters.
-17-TABLE 1: DATA PARAMETERS
GNP N p p 5NA(%)
CAN 543.63 1.15 1.2 5 1.15 lOS 49.53
USA 5166.09 1.1 1.1 8 1.0 1.00 83.79
MEX 211.97 1.7 1.5 5 1.4 1.20 100.00
ROW 17495.40 1.1 1.1 12 1.0 1.05
TABLE 2: PROTECTION LEVELS
CAN.CARS USA.CARS MEX.CARS ROW.CARS
CAN .335 .125
USA .335 .125
MEX 0.095 0.038 .125
ROW 0.095 0.038 .335
CAN .PARTS USA.PARTSMEX.PARTS ROW.PARTS
CAN 0.17 0.065
USA 0.17 0.065
MEX 0.092 0.040 0.065
ROW 0.092 0.034 0.16
TABLE 3: TRADE FLOWS: CARS (NET) AND PARTS (CROSS)
CAN.CARS USA.CARS MEX.CARS ROW.CARS
CAN 3.347 11.970
USA 140.345
MEX 1.989 4.430 0.243
ROW 3.496 32.027 400.199
CAN.PARTS USA.PARTSMEX.PARTS ROW.PARTS
CAN 2.680 6.392 0.072 0.152
USA 9.669 71.267 2.664 3.532
MEX 0.285 0.870 3.505 0.587
ROW 1.929 11.564 0.427 149.167
TABLE 4: CALIBRATED AND SELECTED PARAMETERS
PS, PCm QNA
CAN 0.700.20 1.0 0.27 .240 2.45
USA 0.500.20 1.0 0.22 .091 0.88
MEX 0.700.20 1.0 0.23 .499 2.49
ROW 0.350.20 1.0 0.01 1.00
-18-Table 5givesthe effects of a North American free trade area (NAFTA)
in autos and parts, removing all protection on autos and parts within North
America. All variables are in percentage changes except the last two. Mexico
is a major gainer from this liberalization, gaining 0.9%. This is impressive
since the sector is less than 3 % of GNP and since US protection is initially
very low. The US and Canada suffer trivial losses. Mexico has a large gain
in auto output (147%) along with a strong rationalization effect on output per
firm (114%). Parts output increases by 24% despite the fact that it is a net
import industry (exports decrease, imports increase). The US experiences
essentially a zero change in parts production, as increased exports to Mexico
are balanced by the loss of domestic sales. The Mexican price of autos falls
significantly (11%) generating a further consumer surplus gain to complement
the industrial organization gains.
Table 6 analyzes a unilateral Mexican policy of removing protection
against US and Canadian auto parts. The resulting Mexican welfare gain is
highly significant given the size of the sector, and given that it has some
monopoly power over the inputs as noted above. Here we see some of the
effects identified in the theoretical section of the paper. Output per firm in
autos
-19-TABLE 5: NAFFA, ALL PROTECTION REMOVED WITHIN
NORTH AMERICA
CAN USA MEX ROW
(% change in)
WELFARE -0.01 -0.01 0.90
NUMBER OF AUTO FIRMS 0.54 -1.76 15.24
AUTO OUTPUT -2.97 -4.91 146.54 -0.32
AUTOS PER FIRM -3.48 -3.21 113.93 -0.33
PARTS OUTPUT -2.12 -0.15 23.73 -0.36
AUTO EXPORTS -4.18 408.51 -5.18
AUTO IMPORTS -1.12 15.35 -100.00
PARTS EXPORTS -2.72 14.27 -2.02 -1.52
PARTS IMPORTS -1.59 -3.76 86.87 -0.35
PRICE OF AUTOS -0.20 -0.13 -11.15 -0.05
NA FIRM MARKUPS (level) 0.24 0.09 0.43
ROW FIRM MARKUPS (level) 0.10 0.01 0.08
TABLE 6: MEXICAN PROTECTION AGAINST US AND
CANADIAN PARTS REMOVED
CAN USA MEX ROW
(% change in)
WELFARE 0.40
NUMBER OF AUTO FIRMS -0.75 -0.99 6.95 -0.31
AUTO OUTPUT -2.38 -2.20 81.91 -0.30
AUTOS PER FIRM -1.63 -1.22 70.08
PARTS OUTPUT -0.98 0.24 12.43 -0.30
AUTO EXPORTS -2.96 226.01 -0.47
AUTO IMPORTS 0.14 6.88 558.32
PARTS EXPORTS -1.01 8.26 -2.61 -0.64
PARTS IMPORTS -1.51 -1,74 51.56 -0.35
PRICE OF AUTOS -0.05 -8.02 -0.05
NA FIRM MARKUPS (level) 0.24 0.09 0.47
ROW FIRM MARKUPS (level) 0.10 0.01 0.08
TABLE 7: MEXICAN PROTECTION ON US AND CANADIAN
PARTS LOWERED TO 1%
CAN USA MEX ROW
(% change in)
WELFARE 0.39
NUMBER OF AUTO FIRMS -0.70 -0.93 6.54 -0.30
AUTO OUTPUT -2.23 -2.07 77.38 -0.29
AUTOSPERFIRM -1.54 -1.15 66.49
PARTS OUTPUT -0.92 0.22 11.88 -0.28
-20-expands significantly (70%) (footnote 2, section 2) so the Mexican economy
captures the benefits of decreasing average cost (increasing productivity).
Auto exports from Mexico expand significantly (226%), and we argued earlier
that they are under exported initially. Parts production expands in Mexico
(12%) as do parts imports (52%) which help fuel the auto sector expansion.
As discussed in section 2, domestic Mexican auto parts are under supplied
initially, so this expansion in the Mexican parts sector confers a welfare
benefit to Mexico.
The welfare increase in Table 6 from Mexico's unilateral elimination of
its 17% protection against US and Canadian parts does not imply that there
might not be some optimal protection level between zero and 17 % which
increases welfare above either extreme. Simulations in between these values
convinces us that welfare is monotonically decreasing with protection on parts,
and we report partial results for lowering protection to 1 % in Table 7.
Welfare for Mexico increases by 0.39%, less than the 0.40% increase under
full removal of protection. Relative to free trade in parts, the 1 % protection
on parts reduces domestic production, consumption and export of autos and
reduces the domestic production of auto parts. Domestic and foreign parts are
indeed general-equilibrium complements in our model. The theory in section
two above thus helps explain the result that this small level of protection is
welfare reducing despite the existence of some monopoly power in trade for
Mexico.
-21-5. Summaryand Conclusions
Existing analyses of increasing-returns, differentiated products have
generally focused on final consumer goods, and have made the natural
assumption in this context that domestic and foreign varieties are better
substitutes for one another than for other classes of commodities. Since the
domestic goods are undersupplied in initial free-trade equilibrium (price
exceeds marginal cost), protection has the beneficial effect of shifting
expenditure to the domestic goods, thereby creating a welfare benefit to the
domestic economy in addition to the normal terms-of-trade effect.
Markusen (1989, 1990) focuses on differentiated intermediate inputs
following Ethier (1982), and raises the possibility of complementarity between
domestic and foreign inputs. This then reverses the above argument about
protection. The present paper reviews this point and then adds a further
consideration. If the intermediates are in turn used as inputs into a good(s)
produced with increasing returns, and therefore also undersupplied initially,
we have a further argument against protection.
After developing the theoretical argument, the paper extends the earlier
auto model of Hunter, Markusen, and Rutherford by adding a parts sector.
The earlier paper focussed on the effects of multinational price and output
coordination, and on the consequence of market segmentation. In this paper,
the extended model is used to evaluate trade policy for the differentiated
intermediates. We find that the welfare-maximizing unilateral, non-negative
protection policy for Mexico is zero protection on parts. Protection reduces
the output and exports of the increasing- returns auto sector, and also reduces
the output of the increasing-returns domestic Mexican parts sector. These
generate negative welfare effects that dominate whatever small terms-of-trade
benefit such protection might generate for Mexico. Given the large share of
producer intermediate goods in total imports of many developing countries,
these results may have some general applicability.
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